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STATE OF UTAH 
MILDRED D. DUBOIS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
F. RAY DUBOIS, JR., 
Defendant-AppeUant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12820 
This is an action to dissolve a marriage that was con-
summated December 13, 1942, and for a determination 
and an equitable allocation of the marital estate with ali-
mony and incidental relief by way of attorney's fees and 
costs of suit. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After three days of trial the lower court by its Mem-
orandum Decision (R. 16-18) directed a decree of divorce 
in favor of respondent with alimony in the monthly 
amount of $375.00, attorney's fees of $10,000.00 and a par-
tition of the marital estate of the then fair current value 
of approximately $570,000.00 on the basis of 40 per cent 
to appellant and 60 per cent to respondent. 
2 
The marital estate consisted of real and personal 
property, some in joint tenancy, some in co-tenancy and 
other portions in the individual names of the parties. The 
Memorandum Decision dated August 4, 1971, while de-
lineating certain guidelines, admonished counsel for both 
parties and solicited their sound discretion and stipulation 
so that federal mid state income tax and other considera-
tions and consequences might be worked out to the maxi-
mum possible benefit or batr:. J.PlJc:lla..11t an<l respondent. 
FuI1ctioning within the perimeter of the Memoran-
dum Decision Richard I-I. Stahle, Esq., of counsel for 
appellant and Gregory VI. Aggeler, C.P.A., of Touche 
Ross & Co. for respondent, both being recognized by the 
parties as being knowledgeable in the field of income tax 
law, consulted each with the other and arrived at a divi-
sion of specific items all as reflected in the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law (R. 34-42) which findings were 
adopted by the trial court on January 10, 1972, and car-
ried forward into the decree of divorce entered the same 
day (R. 43-49). The adjustments as made showed a total 
gross dolla:.· estate of $578,407.00 as of May 31, 1971, with 
items of a given dollar amount of $347,044.00 allocated to 
respondent and items of a given dollar amount of $231,-
363.00 allocated to appellant (R. 29-33). 
The matter of the settlement of findings based upon 
the allocation as set forth above was by motion (R. 26) 
which motion came on before the court for hearing on 
January 10, 1972, at which time, in the absence of specific 
objections with regard to the various items as the same 
3 
were allocated between the parties (R. 71-77), the find-
ings \V8re settled and the decree was entered from which 
appdlant now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts does not do justice to 
the record and in some respects is at variance with the 
same. The item of $581,911.00 that is mentioned several 
times in appellant's brief and particularly on page 3 is 
opposed to the item of $570,000.00, which latter figure was 
used by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision of 
August 4, 1971, as being the approximate fair current 
market value of the estate. The $581,000.00 plus figure is 
an accounting problem and appellant is in no position to 
assert the same, which figure he states as being taken 
from pages 5-6 of the findings of fact (R. 38-39). There 
are no totals shO\vn on those pages but there is an expla-
nation by way of "notes" (R. 30) which is a part of the 
analysis and evaluation as presented to counsel in con-
nection with the motion fixing time to settle the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and for the entry of the 
decree, which proposed findings are likewise attached to 
the motion ( R. 26-49) . 
Paragraph 4 of the motion (R. 27) states that the 
various documents, which included the proposed findings, 
conclusions and decree, and the analysis and evaluation, 
the latter being the result of communications between 
Gregory vV. Aggeler for respondent and Richard H. Stahle, 
Esq., for appellant, were supplied to counsel for appellant 
--
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m lieu of a proposed stipulation contemplated by the 
Memorandum Decision (R. 16-18) so as to give the appel-
lant an opportunity to make such objections at the time 
fixed to settle the findings, if any he may have, to the 
documents as so prepared (R. 27). At the hearing on 
January 10, 1972, there were no objections to the segrega-
tion of assets and the valuations given to the same (R. 
71-77). The many repeated statements of this court are 
to the effect that matters not raised li1 the lower court 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Appellant's statement of the facts gives the court no 
information with regard to the events leading up to the 
divorce proceedings and undue emphasis is placed upon 
the death of respondent's uncle, Dr. Charles E. Hirth, 
who in his lifetime was a most generous benefactor by 
way of gifts to the parties jointly and individually. Em-
phasis, by way of a factual statement, is placed upon the 
speculative and conjectural benefit to respondent as a 
potential recipient of an estate from her aged mother who 
is now living in a nursing home. The trial court excluded 
the inheritance from Dr. Hirth as a part of the marital 
estate. No reference was made in the findings to the ex-
pectancy following the death, as and when it occurs, of 
respondent's mother. 
Appellant who was 50 years of age at the time of trial 
and respondent who was 51 at said time were, as appel-
lant points out, married on December 13, 1942, in San 
Antonio, Texas. There are two adult children as the issue 
of the marriage, one a son and one a daughter, both of 
whom are mari·icd, and there are grandchildren. But 
there is mo;·c by \Vay of factual statement that appellant 
ooit:0 and that we are impelled to add. 
('r;. ,January 25, 1970, respondent was made aware of 
the fact that her husband was in love with another woman 
(R. 51). To that time the marriage was a definite excep-
tion to the expression that there is never any wholly guilty 
or v1holly innocent party to a divorce action. Appellant 
had the unquestioned affection and confidence of respon-
dent, respondent's mother and other members of respon-
dent's family. Respondent's mother thought that "there 
was no man in the world as great as Ray Dubois" and 
respondent expressed herself "I didn't think there was 
anyone like him either". Dr. Hirth "absolutely adored 
him" (R. 130-131). There is nothing in the record to indi-
cate any disloyalty on respondent's part and their rela-
tionship until the revelation made by appellant, was one 
of the utmost trust and confidence on respondent's side 
(R. 129-130) . 
While in San Francisco with her husband on January 
25, 1970, respondent overheard a telephone conversation 
between her husband and Marjorie Parry, his first cousin. 
A.t the end of the telephone conversation appellant used 
terms of endearment toward his cousin and then when he 
became aware that his wife had overheard his side of the 
conversation, he said "I am in love with another woman" 
and when asked how long the affair had been going on 
"he said for months" (R. 131-134). Between the incident 
in January and the filing of the complaint on the 23rd 
day of June, 1970, (R. 1) there were efforts to get the 
matter "reconciled" (R. 134). 
The parties were members of two country clubs, Wil-
lmv Creek in Salt Lake and Pauma Valley in California, 
both being avid golf players. In the last 20 years of their 
marriage they have taken many trips, stayed at the finest 
hotels, enjoyed all of the comforts of what might be de-
scribed as leisure living, played golf at the most select 
country clubs wherever they happened to be, were socially 
prominent in Salt Lake and charter members of Willow 
Creek since its beginning. They lived in the Mt. Olympus 
area in a home reasonably valued at $50,000.00 (R. 136-
137). Appellant was president of the Utah Golf Associa-
tion and respondent described their social activities as 
being "country club people" having spent the last 10 
years in the golfing world and a great deal of time and 
money in the country club both in Salt Lake and in Pawna 
Valley (R. 138). 
Appellant voluntarily terminated his employment 
with Lees Carpets as of September 30, 1970, and immedi-
ately left Salt Lake to live in San Diego (R. 144) where 
Mrs. Parry was residing (R. 9). Appellant's salltry at the 
time of his termination was $22,000.00 a year and at the 
time of trial, the latter part of July, 1971, he was unem· 
ployed as a matter of his own choosing. His lack of em· 
ployment was in no way, expressly or by implication, at-
tributed by him as a reason for his not paying alimony w 1 
the respondent. Appellant conceded that there was no 
physical or mental condition inhibiting him from the work 
that he was accustomed to doing and that he was think· 
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ing about getting a broker's license in California and per-
haps developing the Pauma Valley property (R. 215). 
With respect to the Pauma Valley property respon-
dent was asked the question and made the answer as fol-
lows: 
"Q. Haven't you stated to Mrs. Parry's boys in 
effect that the Pauma Valley area was most attrac-
tive to you, and that both you and their mother 
were going to build their home there?" (Dep. page 
76, lines 14-16). 
"9. Answer: I recall having stated to Mrs. Par-
ry's boys that the Pauma Valley area was most 
attractive to me. I do not recall having stated to 
Mrs. Parry's boys that I or their mother had plans 
to build any home there, although such a possibil-
ity is an attractive one for me and has been for a 
number of years" (R. 11). 
During the interim between the termination of the 
employment with Lees Carpets and the trial of the case 
in July of 1971 appellant expended capital assets in order 
to meet obligations that had accrued since leaving his 
employment with no compensating job employment from 
that point on (R. 230). The expenditure of capital is one 
of the variables in connection with accounting matters. 
Appellant by his answer (R. 4) admitted that sub-
stantial gifts from respondent's side of the family had 
been made to the parties over the years. Exhibits 2-P 
and 3-P account for the various gross dollars attributable 
to gifts, the investment and reinvestment of the same and 
the imbalance created by appellant in his favor in the in-
8 
vestment of various securities. As of May 31, 1971, a 
surri..mary of the total estate as shown by the exhibits is 
indicated at $588,581.00 with assets in the name of re-
spondent valued at $119,764.00, assets in the name of ap-
pellant valued in the amount of $203,982.00 and in the 
joint names of the parties, assets valued at $264,835.00 
(R. 107-108). There was a single item of $14,225.00 that 
appellant received in 1957 from respondent's mother con-
cerning which he had no present memory (R. 220) but 
which at the time of his deposition he "vaguely" recol-
lected (R. 229). The transmittal of a letter to respon-
dent's mother by appellant mentioning the sum of $14,-
225.00 was corroborated by the witness Stansfield as hav-
ing been seen in appellant's file sometime during the 
month of August, 1970, (R. 234). The frugality of both 
parties to conserve and accumulate an estate is an ad-
mitted fact (R. 222) and Exhibit 1-P kept in the hand 
of appellant is replete with factual information with re-
gard to gifts as well as the plan of early retierment (age 
55) by 1975 with a total gross estate of $750,000.00. This 
item is found in Exhibit 1-P on a page titled Total Assets 
of "Mil & Ray," nine pages forward from the last page of 
Exhibit 1-P. 
Appellant at the end of his statement of facts calls 
attention to the fact that during the period of the mar-
riage he contributed "in excess of $500,000.00 in earned 
income to the marital estate." Whether this amount is 
before or after tax is not indicated, but in any event, it 
averages out at $17,241.00 per year for a marriage of 29 
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years. We submit that it would be impossible for appel-
lant on that salary to rear his family, live on the social 
and economic level of the parties and end up with an 
estate of in excess of $570,000.00 but for the contributions 
by way of gifts admittedly from plaintiff's side of the 
family. 
The following, by way of argument, is in the same 




THE EXCLUSION OF RESPONDENT'S IN-
TEREST IN THE ESTATE OF HER UNCLE 
AND HER EXPECTANCY, IF ANY, OF AN 
INHERITANCE FROM HER MOTHER WHO 
IS STILL LIVING WAS NOT AN ARBI-
TRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ACTION ON 
THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court was aware of the death of Dr. Hirth 
during the month of May, 1970, following the disclosure 
of appellant's relationship with Mrs. Parry and approxi-
mately a month prior to the filing of the complaint. It is 
not clear from appellant's brief whether he claims some 
allocation of that interest or whether the contention is 
that there should be a disclosure and an affirmative show-
ing that the trial court acted with the discretion afforded 
it in such matters. As to the latter, the court expressly by 
10 
its findings of fact awarded to respondent the interest de-
vis12d and bequeated to her by her uncle. 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d 
1056 (19Gl), cited by appellant, is a case that has been 
commented on many times by this court. There is nothing 
in the case that supports appellant's contention and in 
fact it is authority in support of the conclusion arrived 
at in the instant action by the trial court both as to the 
estate of Dr. Hirth and the expectancy, if any, from re-
spondent's mother. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
for such orders in relation to the property "as may be 
equitable." There is no question but what Dr. Hirth made 
substantial gifts both in the way of property and cash to 
respond~mt and appellant during his lifetime. The Illinois 
farm lands, the property near Vernal and many substan-
tial cash contributions came from him and were utilized 1 
by the parties in building up the large estate that the 
trial court had under consideration (R. 126-131) . The 
equities of the situation including the conduct of appel-
lant justify the discretion exercised by the trial court. 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra, has been repeatedly 1 
cited by this court in connection with the proposition that 
a divorce judgment will not be disturbed unless the evi-
dence clearly preponderates against the finding of the trial 
court, or there has been a plain abuse of discretion, or 
1 
where a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought. We 
submit that the judgment in the instant matter cannot 
11 
be equated with any circumstance that the holding in 
MacDonald v. AfacDonald would condemn. 
The facts in the MacDonald case are of a sordid na-
ture and as have many times been stated each case must · 
1°2st on its own factual premise, there being no "rule of 
thumb" in the application of the equitable principles in-
volved. Mrs. MacDonald was the defendant and filed a 
cross complaint for divorce. The trial court entered a 
judgment for the husband and the wife appealed. This 
court held that the evidence supported the finding that 
the wife had been guilty of habitual drunkenness for a per-
iod of at least four years and affirmed the judgment of the 
lower court. Regardless of the defendant's condition which 
the court observed as being in most instances a manifesta-
tion of some mental or nervous illness or maladjustment to 
the problems of life where excessive drinking is often 
sought as an escape from the realities of existence, all of 
the physical assets of the property with the exception of 
the 1949 Hudson automobile were awarded to the defen-
dant and the plaintiff was ordered to pay alimony in the 
sum of $10.00 per year. The trial court was quoted as 
stating: 
"Such assets are sufficient to care for defendant 
* * * and should keep her in such fashion that 
she will not become a charge upon public authori-
ties. Should defendant's financial condition be-
come so that she is in danger of becoming a public 
charge, the duty of support should fall upon the 
plaintiff and not upon the public authorities * * * ." 
Among the assets awarded to the defendant wife in 
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tne MacDonald case was a bank account of a little more 
than $6,900.00 in defendant's name which was the balance 
of an inheritance of $8,000.00 which she had received in 
1950. It was also stated that defendant had an expec-
tancy in the estate of her mother who was 82 years of age 
at the time of the trial. The case contains the oft repeated 
statement as follows: 
"The problem of attempting to do justice to par-
ties in a divorce action as to the division of prop-
erty and the awarding of alimony is undoubtedly 
one of the most perplexing situations ever to con-
front a court. The longer the period of marriage, 
the greater the difficulties. It would be a wise 
judge indeed who could accurately apportion the 
weight of all the factors and arrive at the one cor-
rect solution, if there be such. The problem is of 
such a nature as not to be susceptible of solution 
by any exact formula; indeed the authorities fre-
quently say that for that reason each case must 
be determined upon its own facts." 
The opinion then cites from Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 
255, 67 P. 2d 265 (1937), from which was expressed a gen· 
eral formula in the attempt to get the factors in perspec· 
tivc all of which may not be present or important in every 
case, but which was applied to the evidence in the case 
then before it. The factors thus stated are: (1) the so· 
cial position and standard of living of each before mar· 
riage, (2) the respective age of the parties, (3) what each 
may have given up for the marriage, ( 4) what money or 
property each brought into the marriage, (5) the physical 
and mental health of the parties, (6) the relative ability, 
training and education of the parties. 
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"The following points (7 to 15 inclusive) relate 
to conditions to be appraised at the time of the 
divorce, giving some attention to comparison with 
points 1 to 6 inclusive: " 
(7) the time of duration of the marriage, (8) the present 
income of the parties and the property acquired during 
the marriage and owned either jointly or by each now, 
(9) how it was acquired and the efforts of each in doing 
so, (10) children reared, their present ages, and obliga-
ti'.::ms to them or help which may in some instances be ex-
pected, ( 11) the present mental and physical health of 
the parties, (12) the present age and life expectancy of 
the parties, ( 13) the happiness and pleasure, or lack of 
it, experienced during marriage, (14) any extraordinary 
sacrifice, devotion or care which may have been given to 
the spouse or others, such as mother, father, etc., and 
obligations to other dependents having a secondary right 
to support, (15) the present standards of living and needs 
of each including the cost of living. 
There is nothing in the foregoing that supports appel-
lant's contention that the vested inheritance in the estate 
of Dr. Hirth be included in the "marital estate" if by that 
it is meant faat appellant should participate directly or 
indirectly in the inheritance. Unlike the MacDonald case 
the inheritance came after the breakup of the marriage, 
but there is a similarity in that the bank account of some-
thing in excess of $6,000.00 in Mrs. MacDonald's name, 
identified as the balance of an inheritance, was allocated 
to her intact. All of the material assets including the 
home and the household furniture with the exception of 
14 
the 1049 Hudson automobile were awarded to the defen-
dant \VUC. 
The expression that Mrs. MacDonald "has an ex-
pectancy in the estate of her mother who was 82 years of 
age at th:3 time of the trial" was not equated with either 
a property allocation or alimony, but the court expressly 
stated that Mrs. MacDonald "should not be required to 
look to her mother for supp0rt, but the definite expect-
Emcy in her 82 year old mother's estate is something which 
may 'Iell be kept in mind a:s a future contingency." 
Nothing else was said about the expectancy, in fact 
the conno~::..tion v1ith respect to the m,vard of the nominal 
sum of $10.00 _:Jer year as alimoay ignores the possibility, 
the court stating: 
"In making the decree awarding defendant only 
the nominal sum of $10 per year alimony, which 
was based on the then circumstances, Judge Van 1 
Cott expressly recited that it was for the purpose 
of preserving her right to alimony and directed 
that if danger of dependence appeared, the burden 
of her support would fall upon plaintiff and not 
upon others." (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant cites Michelsen v. Michelsen, 14 U. 2d 328, 
383 P. 2d 932 (1963), as being in accord. In the Michel-
sen case it was stated that the plaintiff wife had an inter-
est in the estate of her deceased father which was valued 
at approximately $19,600.00 and the assertion was made , 
that the trial judge failed to take into consideration the 
inheritance, it being a conceded fact that no mention was 
made of the item in the findings. This court held, how-
15 
ever, that it was apparent that the trial judge did con-
sider it "for it is discussed in his second Memorandum 
Decision". Alimony in the amount of $275.00 a month was 
awarded to the wife and she was awarded the equity in 
the home situ.:o_ted on a 31h acre tract of land in the Holla-
day area upon which the trial court placed a valuation of 
$30,G'.J,).OG which wc_s apparently offset by awarding to the 
haslxmd certain shares of stock which the court found to 
have a value of $20,000.00. The court in affirming the 
d:::c' cc 0i the trial court concluded: 
"The plaintiff is 57 years of age and was, at the 
time of the hearing, unemployed. True, she will 
receive considerable benefit :md help from her in-
heritance. However, v;e cannot say that the lower 
court's determination was manifestly unjust, in-
equitable, or an abuse of discretion warranting this 
court to substitute its judgment therefor." 
Appellant cites Woolley v. Woolley, 113 Utah 391, 
195 P. 2d 7 43 ( 1948) . We fail to find any reference to an 
inheritance vested or otherwise in this case. The court 
remanded the case to the lower court with directions to 
modify the decree for the reason that part of the funds 
jointly accumulated had been reinvested in speculative 
interests which may at some later date greatly increase 
the worth of the defendant husband. The court stated: 
"If the money vested in the mining ventures has 
been earned by the efforts of defendant in his pro-
fession, the efforts of the wife and mother in tak-
ing care of the home and children have assisted de-
fendant in its accumulation. Accordingly, she 
should not be denied her share of any increase in 
value that may result in the future." 
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"The effect of the decree as granted by th2 
court below appears to have been to award the 
plaintiff a cash settlement in lieu of all alimony. 
It is doubtful that the court intended to retain 
jurisdiction of the matter for further proceedings 
in the event defendant realized on his mining in-
vestment. This should be done. * * * The 
specific awards as ordered by the court will be 
permitted to stand except that the sums paid shall 
not be in lieu of all alimony." 
The Woolley case contains the often repeated state-
ment to the effect that the decree of the trial court in 
divorce proceedings relating to alimony and division of 
property will not be modified except when the trial court 1 
has abused its discretion and cites Allen v. Allen, 109 
Utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872 (1946), to that effect. 
In the instant action the trial court was fully aware 
of the death of Dr. Hirth, of the extensive gifts made by 
him to the parties during his lifetime, his affection and 1 
confidence in the solidity of the marriage relationship and 
then by considered judgment excluded appellant from 
participation, directly or indirectly, in the inheritance of 
some $75,000.00 which vested after the breakup of the 
marriage. We submit that under all of the authorities 1 
this was not an abuse of discretion and appellant cannot 
properly complain on that score. Appellant by his brief 
leaves the reader in considerable doubt as to how the 
inheritance could be considered "by the court in adjusting 
the rights of the parties in that estate". 
As to the contention that under the law of this state 
contingent future interests must be considered by the trial 
17 
court in adjusting the parties' rights in the marital estate 
as directed to respondent's expectancy in her mother's 
est:r:e is of startling consequence. We challenge the state-
ment as made and submit that this court in MacDonald 
v. MacDonald, supra, has declared just the opposite. If 
an expectancy in the estate of a living relative must be 
considered by the trial court, the door of discovery is 
opened onto a vista of endless consequences. 
Section 30-3-11.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a 
legislative declaration of public policy of preserving mar-
riages and promoting the public welfare by preserving 
and protecting the institution of matrimony. Just plain 
greed could thwart the whole business if the expectancy 
of inheritance from relatives now living could be exploited. 
The consequence of a discovery deposition directed to the 
monied father-in-law, mother-in-law, spinster aunt, uncle, 
or even a more distant relative, could balloon the whole 
discord of the marital relationship out of any semblance 
of perspective. 
At this point it should be noted that Exhibit 15-D 
projecting appellant's assets including an item of $95,-
000.00 attributable to the estate of his father and mother, 
Exhibit 16-B projecting respondent's assets including an 
estimate of Dr. Hirth's estate and the expectancy of her 
mother's estate (Mrs. Derry) and Exhibits 17-D entitled 
Final Analysis, but projecting inheritances and expectan-
cies from the immedate family of both of the parties were 
not received into evidence and presumably not before the 
court for consideration. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT E X PRE SSL Y RE-
JECTED THE SO-CALLED ''TRUST' ' 
THEORY AS THE BASIS OF ITS DIVISION 
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
Appellant mistakenly argues under his Point II that 
the trial court divided the marital estate on the theory 
that appellant was a trustee and that gifts from respon-
dent's family constituted the corpus of what might be 
termed a trust estate held by appellant for the benefit ' 
of the respondent. The trial court expressly rejected this 1 
theory in the presence of all trial counsel after argument 
and before the Memorandum Decision. This will not be 
denied. 
There was a complete disclosure of the property held 
by the parties, how the same was acquired, the efforts of 
each in doing so and basically the other factors as set forth 
and enumerated in MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra, and 
Pinion v. Pinion, supra. The equities of the situation are 
clearly evident and include the fact that respondent com-
mitted all property as received by her to her husband for 1 
investment and reinvestment to afford their standard of 
living (R. 129-130), and their mutual enjoyment and ex-
clusive country clubs with golf and travel as their pastime 
(R. 136-138) and the endpoint of early retirement (age 
55) on a principal accumulation of more than $750,000.00. ' 
Even a ~ interest in a portion of the Illinois farm 
property that respondent inherited before marriage was 
19 
later put in joint tenancy with her husband (R. 212-213). 
All cash that came to respondent from her family was de-
liven::d to appellant without question (R. 191, 217). Ap-
pellant stated the he never wanted respondent to suffer, 
to be without or to have to work again in her life (R. 
2m). 
Exhibit 1-P, the record book kept by appellant in his 
own handwriting, at the page heretofore referred to, states 
the goal to be accomplished in the following words: 
Goal 1975 Net Worth 
Goal 1966 $500,000.00 
Goal 1970 $600,000.00 
Goal 1975 $750,000.00 
Born 1920 - Retire Age 55 
The affair with Marjorie Parry existed for a consider-
able length of time unbeknovvn to respondent. Appellant 
maintained a joint safety deposit box with Mrs. Parry in 
San Diego which he declined to reveal until he was fur-
nished with evidence of a writing that such a joint safety 
deposit box existed (R. 198-200). The witness was shown 
Exhibit 5-P and recognized his handwriting on the docu-
ment addressed to Mrs. Parry stating "pay (the attorney) 
if you have to. We have plenty in our safety deposit box 
in San Diego." Mrs. Parry's divorce was in July, 1970, 
(R. 184). He maintained a joint safety deposit box with 
Mrs. Parry in the Continental Bank in Salt Lake City (R. 
187). 
Furthermore, appellant no longer wished to remain 
married to respondent but "I have always wanted, and 
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still do want, the plaintiff to be happy and to have all of 
her wishes and needs reasonably satisfied" (R. 11). There 
is ample evidence in the record to justify the findings of 
the trial court that in light of the direct gifts and inherit-
ances from plaintiff's side of the family, the accumulation 
of the parties during the marriage, including the invest-
ments and reinvestments of the gifts and inheritances and 
other assets "it is fair and equitable that the ::i.ccumula-
tions of the parties be divided, so far as can reasonably be 
done, on a basis of 60 per cent to the plaintiff and 40 per 
cent to the defendant" (R. 37) . 
The allocation of the property was not on the theory 1 
that the gifts be isolated from the so-called marital estate 
but to the contrary, the same were treated as a part of 
the marital estate which estate the court divided on a 
basis deemed to be fair and equitable. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 18 U. 2d 286, 422 P. 2d 192 1 
(1967), is cited by the appellant as being a case that con-
sidered the so-called "trust" theory and "flatly rejected 
it". The Anderson case again emphasized that no firm 
rule can be uniformly applied in all divorce cases, that 
each must be determined upon the basis of the immediate ' 
fact situation and that the trial judge has considerable 
latitude of discretion in such matters "and that his judg· 
ment should not be changed lightly, and in fact, not at 
all, unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity , 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." The court men· 
tioned the wide swing of the pendulum by commenting 
on Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U. 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956), 
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where the court awarded substantially all of the property 
possessed by the parties which was in excess of $20,000.00 
to the wife a...'1d approximately $500.00 to the husband. 
In the Anderson case last mentioned there was a debt 
load in excess of $71,000.00 and a net worth of approxi-
mately $10,000.00. Bankruptcy was apparently inevitable 
unless the home was sold and the debts paid. The "novel" 
doctrine was that at the trial it was urged that the wife 
have 12 of the net assets clear of the debts. The decree, 
on the contrary, ordered the accumulated property sold 
to pay the debts and the net assets remaining, if any, to 
be distributed 1/3 to the plaintiff and 2/3 to the defen-
dant. In addition, the plaintiff was awarded $200.00 per 
month as alimony and $900.00 attorneys' fees. Not only 
the property but also the debts were attributable largely 
to the defendant husband and the factual premise was 
entirely distinct and different from the instant case. One 
difference was the fact that both parties had grounds for 
a divorce. In Anderson the court, however, reiterated its 
previous holdings so far as the responsibility of the court 
is concerned. 
"This court has stated that '[t]he court's responsi-
bility is to endeavor to provide a just and equitable 
adjustment of their economic resources so that the 
parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy and 
useful basis. In doing so it is necessary for the 
court to consider, in addition to the relative guilt 
or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all of 
the attendant facts and circumstances: the dura-
tion of the marriage; the ages of the parties; their 
social positions and standards of living; their 
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health; considerations relative to children; the 
money and property they possess and how it was 
acquired; their capabilities and training and their 
present and potential incomes.' " 
POINT III. 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS A PROP-
ER EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant argues in part that the expectancy in re-
spondent's mother's estate, the inheritance that she will 
1 
receive from Dr. Hirth, all coupled with the award of the 1 
marital estate, should offset her need of $750.00 per month 
by way of alimony and this in anticipation of income from 
other sources after the divorce (R. 146). Respondent's 
testimony in that regard was not challenged although in 
the brief appellant characterizes the testimony as "her 
own self-serving statement". It will be recalled that ap- ' 
pellant voluntarily terminated his employment and that 
by not working he did not want it understood that re-
spondent was not entitled to alimony on that account. 
It will also be recalled that he did not want his wife to 
ever work or to suffer financially in any respect. 
Alimony is a matter of discretion based upon variable 
circumstances. In the instant case there was no deter· 
mination of income as distinguished from capital sufficient 
to permit respondent to enjoy the same standard of living 
1 
to which she was accustomed while married to appellant. 
There are, however, certain assets that are income pro· 
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ducing such as the Illinois farm property, paying a little 
over $4,000.00 per year and certain of the securities in 
publicly owned corporations, the dividend income from 
which is not disclosed. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 
9, 12 P. 2d 364 (1932), and Allen v. Allen, supra, are cited 
by counsel and are consistent with the discretion exer-
cised by the trial court, the court having obviously taken 
into consideration the income that respondent can reason-
ably anticipate from other sources when the award was 
in the amount of $375.00 rather than $750.00 per month 
as requested by respondent. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 
sup£a, expressly refers to the fact that it is the husband's 
obligation to support the wife even though in that case 
the wifo was at fault, the court stating that she should not 
be required to look to others in that regard, making spe-
cific reference to an expectancy from her aged mother's 
estate &s and when she died. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 14 U. 2d 24, 376 P. 2d 547 
(1963), there was substantial property awarded to the 
wife and likewise $1,250.00 per month as alimony. The 
court stated: 
"It is apparent from the court's distribution of the 
property that the husband was left with the where-
withall to continue producing a substantial sum of 
money and also substantial interests in real and 
personal property were allowed to be retained by 
him, so that it does not appear he will be greatly 
hindered in the mode of living to which he has 
accustomed himself. The wife has been given some 
income producing property, as well as alimony, so 
that she can continue living in the style to which 
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she has become accustomed during the marTiage. 
Under such circumstances, this court cannot say 
that there has bsen a plain abuse of discretion or 
that the awards are unjust and inequitable. Un-
less there is manifest injustice and inequity or a 
clear abuse of discretion, this court will not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the trial court." 
POINT IV. 
THE A WARD OF A TIORNEYS' FEES IS 
CONSISTENT WITH CASES OF THIS KIND. 
Appellant does not question the amount of the re- 1 
quested attorneys' fee which was the subject of proof 1 
(R. 236-237) and which is outlined in Exhibit 12-P. The 
Utah cases cited by appellant, namely, Alldredge v. All-
dredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P. 2d 681 (1951) and Weiss v. 
Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P. 2d 1005 (1947), are not in 
point and do not support the contention that attorneys' 
fees to a wife must be based upon need and a showing that 
she has no separate estate from which to pay the same. 
In the Alldredge case the husband brought the action 
and was awarded the divorce. The wife was the one at 
fault and her counterclaim was dismissed. The trial court 
denied the wife alimony and attorneys' fees and this court 
while affirming the decree of divorce remanded the case 
for the purpose of awarding the defendant counsel fees 
and determining the amount of alimony, regardless of the 
fact that she had been found guilty of misconduct result-
ing in a divorce against her. 
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In the Weiss case the husband's action for divorce 
was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. As to attorneys' 
fees, the court stated: 
"The statute does not contemplate that awards 
for expenses of suit or for temporary alimony 
should be made only in those cases where the 
'adverse party' (usually the wife) is destitute or 
practically so. It contemplates such awards when 
in the sound discretion of the court the circum-
stances of the parties are such that in fairness to 
the wife she should be given financial assistance 
by her husband in her prosecution or defense of 
the divorce action, and for her support during its 
pendency." 
In Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P. 2d 650 
( 1952) , the court sets forth the above quoted portion from 
the Weiss case and then concludes: 
"The rights of the wife to attorneys' fees when she 
is forced to go to court to enforce a divorce decree 
should not be different from those of one who seeks 
temporary alimony. The court did not err in grant-
ing attorneys' fees to respondent." 
In Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 222 P. 2d 1055 
(1950), attorneys' fees were awarded the wife with the 
statement that "Evidence as to what would constitute a 
reasonable attorneys' fee was not a prerequisite to an 
award thereof when the case was contested and foe court 
awarded only a modest fee." Butler v. Butler, 23 U. 2d 
259, 461 P. 2d 727 (1969), could be said to be an excep-
tion to the statement just made to the extent that there 
must be evidence to sustain a finding in support of an 
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o~·der avmrd~ng attorneys' fees to the plaintiff wife. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, supra, this court sustained 
a substantial 8.ttarneys' fee although the plaintiff wife 
was awarded property and alimony of consequence. In 
the instant action appellant would have this court an-
nounce a rule that is contrary to precedent and to the ' 
everyday practice of trial courts throughout the state in , 
th2 award of attorneys' fees to the wife irrespective of her 
fin:mcial necessity and of her own ability to pay such fees. 
POINT V. 
THE DECREE WAS NOT PREMISED UPON 
A VINDICTIVE OR PUNITIVE PREMISE. 
No one ever "wins" in a divorce action. The back-
ground history of the parties to the instant action spells 
a tragedy and yet, human nature being what it is, the r 
falling out of love is not a rarity. Seldom, however, do • 
people go "first class" when the parting of the ways occurs 
at the ages and after the accumulations as found in the 
instant case and with retirement at the age of 55 with ,. 
material assets of % of a million dollars the mutual goal 
of the parties. It is undoubtedly the respondent who feels 
that she has come out on the short end, the fortune hav-
ing been acquired through gifts from her side of the fam- ' 
ily, the husband not only having betrayed the wife but 
also the donors. Be that as it may, Wilson v. Wilson, 
supra, cited by appellant under this point, states that as 
a practical matter the court invariably does consider the 
relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to their mar-
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riage vows and the relative guilt or innocence in causing 
the breakup of the marriage. 
The trial court was sensitive to the expression used 
i11 Wilson v. Wilson, supra, to the effect that there was 
no authority in our law for administering punitive mea-
sures when after hearing the testimony with regard to 
the telephone conversation on January 25, 1970, between 
appellant and Mrs. Parry and the final separation of the 
parties, he interrupted by asking respondent if the mat-
ters to which she had testified caused her extreme mental 
anguish to which she answ<)red affirmatively, then said 
the "grounds are complete" (R. 134). 
Appellant's voluntary retirement from Lees Carpets 
on September 30, 1970, his association with Mrs. Parry, 
his offer to contribute t.o the expense of her divorce, the 
fact of the joint safety deposit box with Mrs. PaITy both 
in Salt Lal~e and in San Diego, his rapport with Mrs. 
Parry's sons both by way of trips outside of the United 
States and with regard to projected plans for Pauma Val-
ley, coupled with his expenditure of capital assets rather 
than to secure a job after a demonstrated earning capacity 
of some $22,000.00 a year were matters that went to 
credibility, including the accounting of the marital estate. 
In the Wilson case which was tried before Judge 
Wahlquist in Davis County, the husband asked plaintiff 
to secure a divorce for the reason that he was in love with 
another woman and wanted to marry her. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that the divorce was indispensable to his plans 
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he desired to be released from the bonds of matrimony at 
the least possible economic disadvantage to himself. The 
trial court awarded the wife all of the property possessed 
by the pmiies except for $500.00 as indicated and then re-
quired the defendant by way of an award of property, to 
pay the cash sum of $5,000.00 payable $50.00 a month. 
The only change that this court made was to reduce the 
$5,000.00 payment to $2,400.00 payable $50.00 per month . 
or until the plaintiff's remarriage, whichever event oc-
curred first in point of time. In so doing the court, never-
theless, made the following observation: 
"The more recent pronouncements of this court, 
and the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect ' 
that the trial judge has considerable latitude of 
discretion in such matters and that his judgment 
should not be changed lightly, and in fact, not at 
all, unless it works such a manifest injustice or 
inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was represented by extremely competent 
counsel. The case was contested at every level to the ex· 
tent of even denying the grounds of divorce. The record 
discloses a patient, tolerant and understanding attitude 
on the part of the trial court toward both parties. There 
was no semblance of a punitive nature. But as in Wilson 
v. Wilson, appellant obviousily desired to be relieved from 
the bonds of matrimony at the least possible economic 
disadvantage to himself. Why he did not engage in some 
compensable work activity is only known to himself, but 
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he disclaimed his retirement from work at the age of 50 
as not meaning to deprive respondent of alimony and he 
expressed the desire that she continue to live in the man-
ner to which she had been accustomed and that she never 
be required to work. 
As the court has expressed, these cases take almost 
the wisdom of a Solomon in their equitable solution and 
thi::; applies equally to the task of counsel, who on both 
sides, or,rer a long period of time, must constantly be alert 
to the sensitivities of their respective clients and to the 
ultimate outcome which can be rationalized on a fair and 
equitable basis. 
In the instant matter the rationalization of a fair and 
equitable financial consequence in favor of the respondent 
is ignored by appellant and he unfairly charges the trial 
court with being biased and prejudiced. As in the Wilson 
c1~.e the falling in love with another woman with the pres-
sure of dissolving the bonds of matrimony has its own 
devastating effect. Here we have grandparents who out-
wardly lived an extremely happy and constructive life, 
but now the attack is on the trial court. This is an irra-
tional act of one suffering from an extreme guilt complex, 
unable in the ordinary course of things to accept the full 
consequence of his own voluntary whim and act. He 
apparently cannot adjust himself to the fact that he has 
indulged in one of the most expensive and devastating 
"luxuries" of life. 
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The decree of the trial court should be sustained with 
such affirmative relief by way of costs and attorneys' fees 
on appeal as to this court may seem proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
Harley W. Gustin 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondenl 
